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uv('nthal nllIl Rohin~on of the Court
of Appeals for the \li~trict of Columbia
Circuit allended.
In the evcning (hid Ju!'tice Traynor
hi!! alillre!'!' on the uni\'er!'ity cam·
pu~, I'hoo~in~ u!' hi" topiG "Statutes ne·
volving in Common·Law Orhits".
~a\'e

You ohtain a copy hy writing the
Catholic Uni\'er!lity of America, Wash·
in;.:ton, D. C. 20017, and asking for the
Summer, IIJGfl, is!!ue (17 Catholic Uni.
vcrsity {Jaw Rcvicw 401, S2.00).

Reactions
to Current
legal
Literature

edited by
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE

ROGER J. TRAYNOR: The Pope
John lecturer at the Catholic Univer·
sity of America this year was none
other than Chief Justice Roger J. Tray.
nor of the Supreme Court of Califor.
nia. Admiral F. Trowbridge vom Baur
(who was promoted from commodore
to admiral by his frienos when he be·
came General Coun!'d of the Navy duro
ing the Eisenhower Administration,
even though his only ship is a sailboat
at Kennebunk Port) convened a spe·
cial luncheon of the Milkweed March.
ing and ChO\\"flcr Society in Roger's
honor at the 1\ ,tI ional Lawyers's Club.
Some forty Wa~hin~ton lawyers, Chief
Justice Warren and Judges Burger,
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To Traynor, Pope John is "one of
the great men of our time". His "noble
example" renews "faith everywhere in
the world that human beings can reo
solve their problems with reasoning
humanity" and, therefore, his "vision"
encompas!'es "a context of legc ct
gregc, of rules in relation to people".
Statutes "are of infinite variety in
purpose", and "legislators innovate
them w.ith a freedom unknown to
judges, who mu~t ordinarily stay
within the confines of precedent and
articulate the reasons for their rules".
The "hydrnheaded prohlem" for the
poor judge who makes use of statutes
"i!' how to synchronize" these "un·
guided missiles launched by legisla.
tures with a going system of common
law".
Because the volume of lawmaking is
now so great, we "no longer can allord
to have judges retreat into formulism,
as they have rec urringly done in the
past to shield wooocn precedents from
any radiations of forwarcl·looking stat·
utes", while they ignore the "dry rot in
the precedents themselves".
Recognizing that "such spells of for·
mulism in the law come and ~o, in·
duced by shifts in politics and philoso.
phy", Chief Justi ce Traynor' contends,
as did l1oseoe Pound, James Landis
a'nd William Page before him, that
"for lIlany centuries j uclges ha\'e been
accomodating statutes to the common
law openly or indir~rtly, expansively
or warily". These and other scholars
have heen "piecing together fragments
of old records to yield a chronicle of
what might today he called the con·
glomerate merger" • I judicial rules and
statutes".
Long before the Ili!ICovery of Amer·
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ir:a the En;: I i,h I:(,urt~ m;-e.jc u'c of ~tat·
utes to develop thc cOI"",on law },y a
"sweetly namcer' an(1 "imaginatiH~ ly
conccived "doctrinc calbl "the C(luity
of the ~tatllte".
The rl!~i~tance of the law tt) chan;!c
heing what it is, the chief ju~tice as!!urcs us the "it was not the a,'era~e an·
cestor·judge who took the initiati,·e in
the !!earch for the edelweiss, the rare
decision
whose center rea!oning
emerges to dominate its woolly con·
lext". The judge who thus used a stat·
ute to decide a point not covered br it
neecled to il1\'oke "5ueh magic words as
equity oj tire $Ialute".
The doctrine of the efjuity of the
statute became "8 double-edged de·
vice" that enabled common law jUllges
to write exceptions into loose 5tatutory
generalizations and hrin;; within the
reach of the statute situations that ad·
mittedly lay without its exprcss term~.
A judge who feared Blackstone and
did not wish to be caught "en ~ a~ed in
lawmaking", not deeming him self "a
piece of the action", would "sprin;; to
life when a statutc bearing on the ea~c
before him came into ,·iew". Then, you
see, he "would not he stepping beyond
the bounds of his own domain".
Suppose. for example. a statute bear·
ing a phra~e like X numb", r of )'(,3r5.
l'prcifyinl! that it shall apply to A an.!
B and clearly IInconcerne.! with any·
one el~e. Why not an equi-·al ent rule
for C? the Judge mi~ht ask him <e lf.
when there is a pcrplexing C hdure
the court who apprars to he a lillie
cousin, if not the sihling of A and n.
Whatever this eOllrageous jud;;e
"chose. to call his method, he would hc
creatin g law with a capital C". Though
ostensibly "acting under the infiuence
of a statute", the "rule he created was
his own".
Chief Justice Traynor finels that "far
back in time, when lihrari es were not
yet creaking under thc w('i ~ ht of law
tOIllCS, the chalty Year llo oks werc re·
plete with ercati,'e lawmaking in the
courts on the ba~i5 of statutes". In
truth, he concludes that "J udges U5etl
the eyes at the back of Iheir heads to
note statutory rules as a "ouree for an·
alogous decisions."
For instance, in 1:m;) a Year Book
(Y.B. 32 Edw. 1 519, 520, cited in 3
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Holrlsworth,-lJis{ory 0/ Ellglish Law
169, 3d ed. 1923) tells us that
Hugo and other~, wilh the whole
county and the King'~ tennnts o( the
,·i1l and land o( Montgomery ~ued E.
de Morluomari (or that he hnd cle·
(orcrd 1hem of their common of pas·
ture in L., thrir free chase nnd fishery
throllj:lwut the whole o( Sahrina. and
of nil their ~trenms in the land o( K.
Traynor comments on this pleading
that neither the "most indilTerent" nor
"the dullest J udgc" could . turn "a deaf
ear to such a huc and cry" and remain
"unmoved . by the visions of Jlugo and
others turned back in a pasture thcy
regularly traversed", halted "on their
customary free chasc throu~h Sabrina,
commandrd to lay down their fishing
rods" and "abruptly barred from the
use of their familiar streams".
How to give relief?
The judges did so by noting that in
the ple;Hling Hu~o and his friends al·
le~ed that they had enjoyed the uses in
qurstioJl "from before tire lime 0/
memo·r y". This they readily equated
"with the year 1139, when Richard the
Lionhearted acceded to the throne and
held that a continuous use since that
year would be conclusively presumed
to be of lawful or::;in".
The judges "fastened lIpon the year
I W9 by analogy to the Statute of
Westminster I (1295) which specificd
that year as marking the limit of time
in which a plaintilT in a Writ of ni~ht
could trace his titlc". But as the chief
justice sayi', "it took judicial imagina.
tion" to see a statute marking title to
property as likewise appropriate to
mark a right to an eai'ement; more es·
pecially when 106 years stretched be·
tween thc marking year 1139 and the
date of the statute, 1295.
When it became impractical to prove
continuolls use hack to 1 Hl9, our courts
in "the late ci;o l.teenth century" began
to "accept prouf of twenty years of
continuous use to buttress a plea ·of

a fictional lost grant". The twenty·year
period came from a statute of James I
that the courts had prev.i ously held to
be "applicable to actions of eject.
ment".
In 1623 there was a statute of limita·
tion covering "a range of common law
writs". In 17()7, 141 years later, "Lord
Camden heard a plea to set aside a
clearly erroneous thirty.year old decree". His Lordship evaded (Iecision by
recourse to "the statute that barred any
action on a Bill of Error at common
law after twenty years".
Similarly, in missing person cases,
by analogy to early statutes, our courts
have gradually fixed on "an unex·
plained absence of more than seven
years" as creating a presumption of
death.
Likewise, "the origins of the offense of conspiracy" are in the "Third
Ordinance of Conspirators enacted in
1301 in the reign of Edward I, Long.
shanks", which prohibited "confederacies for the false aIHI malicious proeure.
ment of indictments". Ultimately, by
expansive interpretation of this statute,
"the judges wrote into the common law
the generalization that an agreement to
commit any crime was a criminal con·
. "•
splTacy
Roger Traynor helieves .it to be "one
of the gentle ironies that the mother
country's most unruly children, the
American colonists, founded a govern·
~ent whose courts would rely at first
primarily on the parental rules in its
legal matters". Bllt "when the colonies
became the United States, parental
rules were in c. reasingly subj ec t to in·
spection at the border to determine
their adaptability to the native soil".
States dilTered 1I~ 10 their willingne1's
to receive either P, itish common law
or statutes. "SOIIII ' courts recognized
only statutes that had either codified

the Common law or had been a!~imi
lated into it." for instance, in W13
Ohio did this in a real estate ca -c
(Crawford v. Clwpman, 17 Ohio
449, 453) because the English statute
in question there had some three cen·
turies earlier abolished "the Common
law rule that choses in action were not
assignable". By so doing, the statute
"remained forever a stranger to the
common law" and was not "part and
parcel of it".
Apparently. Chief Justice Traynor
has visited Ohio becau~e he remarks
that "In Ohio one did not take chances
with such innovation, even thou~h its
respectable place in English law for
more than three hundred years sug·
gested that it had lon~ since been as·
siniilated into the (;omll1on law."
But most courts, Roger assurcs us,
"received English statutes, including
this one, more hospitably".
For instance, "there was a disposi.
tion to receive English statutes enacted
before 1776 as part of the common
law, suhject to such tests of relcvance
and propriety as were applicahlc to
judge-made rules". "The prrponderant
v.iew was that indic:cnous law could not
assimilate any Enc:lish rule inconsist·
cnt with its own rules or repugnant to
its tenor."
But judges in California and c1~e
where "saw no rra~nn why they should
limit reception to 'the ancient and fre·
quently most barbarous rules and cu:,,·
toms of the common law', and in so
doing refused to take into account the
mit igation of their harshness and the
broadening of the rulrs themselves
which followed the !,\lII'cessive enact·
ments of the En~li s h ~llIllItes".
Aceordingly, Cali fornia courts "re·
jected early the Statutes of Enroll-
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ments", rejected also the Statute of
l iscs "ins .. far as it purported to vest
lel.!al title in the cestui que trust", and
when dcaling, with the Statute of Eliza·
l>l'lh, "perillitting enforcemcnt of char·
itaLic Irml~, they took care tu note that
it was not 'technically adopted', since
its procedllres were 'totally inappli.
caLle to \Jur social or political con·
dition' ".
"American judges were compelled to
playa far more creative role in the law
than their En glish contemporaries and
as time wcnt on there would be no end
to the creativity required to meet the
novel prol,lems of a rapidly growing
economy." Compare Blackstone, who
had among other things "made it plain
that 'the husband and wife [became]
one person in law', and then made it
plainer that the wife was not the one".
But "who today would condemn his
mother or sister, let alone his wife or
daughter, to banishment in the world
of Blackst"ne?"
As we all know, it took the married
WOlnell's ~tatules for women to be
"recognized as people" and a constitu·
ticmal am cndlllent 10 perlllit them to
vole. As Hoger Traynor says, "there
wcre alJullllant legal rules to keep her
in ordcr as the zero in oneness" and
the new statutes were ncedcd "to give
ilnjlctus to Ilew j udgc-made rulcs" to
free her.
To gi ve some idea how long it takes
for courb to rid our law of fo rmulistic
rules, the t:hicf justice tells us that it
\,as not ulilil 1'JG], Illat California was
able to O\'C'I rule all ] :~:y) decisi(JII "tllat
there cOlJld be Ill) c(JIIsl'iracy J,dwc:c'n
Jlu,IJiJlld ." .. 1 wife". J Ie rejoices in telling u~ tl'_11 ill Cdif'JfIlia Il)day, "Thc
fic;ti(Hlal lJ"ity of llU~b<AIHI <And wife has

] O:~3

bcen substantially vitiatc!l by over.
whelming evidence that one plus one
adds up to two, even in twogether.
ness." (Cali/orllia v.Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d
871), 8UO, 395 1'. 2d 3'J3, 8')4- (1964) •
•• "Two years earlier, in the appropri.
ately.named case of Scli v. Scli. [53
Cal. 2d 633, 376 P. 2d 65 (1962)] the
court ruled that onc spouse Illay reo
cover against unother in tort."
Of course, in thc conspiracy case the
court hall "tu reckon with the argue
ment that it sllUulcJ leave any new rule
to the legislaturc since its old rule had
endured so long". This is an argument
which "dies hard becuuse old age tends
to command respcct and we arc likely
to ignore that many an olll rule has
survived in u comatose state, some.
times from the outset, because its vital·
ity has not been tested by the rigors of
· - . " • "A v~~.
new I ItlgatlOn
'ClIeI e en.
sues. for the longer a rule exists, the
more likely it is to discourage such
testing."
In California v. Pierce, Traynor tells
us, his court was "confronted with a
moribund rule that was pat ently ,mait·
ing a coup de grace". IIis court ob·
liged, noting tlrat "the rule ha!1 been
judicially created in the first place and
hence it would he inappropriate to
await its undoing by the legislature".
The chief justice acknowledges that
while "it has taken doing and re·
doing", nevertheless down through the
years judges "have thus lIlnplific:d thc
range allll steadied the course of sUl'h
legislative mis~iles as Married Women's
Statutcs".
Turning then to "the penal or regu·
latory statutes constructed to specific
standards of <.unduet", Hoger Traynor
find~ tllat COlli I. have 110 dillic 'ulty in
ca~es in\'olvill:- di,.,:cl vi"latiolls; tile
"judicial gui,I,II ... c" prul,lelll is 110t
with IIII! ~I,,''''''~ tlwlll si-Ive" hilt,
rather "wilh nil the: unidentified flying
objects that d" ""I cOllie strictly within
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their oriJit". Particularly in civil ca ses
on negligcnce, judges "have still to
make optimum use of penal or regula.
tory statutes".
In Sa((erlee v. Orange Glen School
Dis/riel. 29 Cal. 2d 531, 177 P. 2d 279
(l 9.J7), there were "large differences
of judicial opinion". One was that the
violation of a penal statute was merely
evidence of negligence, another, that it
was a relJutt"hle presumption of QeC;lige llce. Traynor's own view was "and
still is, that the statutory standard , for
penal liability was the appropriate one
for civil liability and hence that a violatioll of the statute was negligence per
se " •
ny instructing a jury under the
standard of the penal statute, the trial
judge "guides the flying objects of
civil litigation on a course that can be
ratiolwlly synchronized with that of
the pilut penal statute".
In the chief's view, "It would be
wastef ul for courts not to utilize such
statutory materials when they are so
readily available for analogy as well as
for adoption." Particularly, "statutes
that protcct specified classes of people
frolll specifled ri~ks" are "rich sources
of analugy". "It is logic run riot" to
arguc "that a statute re<Jlliring the barrieadill g of an open well or elevator
shaft for Ihe protection of emplo}'ee~
canll"t, by virtue of its particularity.
bc invoked for the protection of any
others."
Alld Rop:er TruYllor then remarks
with that beautiful liquid prose of his,
so rl'mini~ccllt of tlat' ~entle, loving
nenjalllill Cardozo: "The well alH1 the
elevator shaft !lnt! the busy inter:,oectiull
IIptly illustJ'<Ite a first·grade readcr 011
the mounting interactions of human
ent( ~ rprise, the llIC11l1ltillg statutes tlwt
~o\'c-nr ~uch t'ntl'fl'ri~t-, IIllcl the moullt·
illg u,.,c thal juclgc-s Illake of statuks
that ~l'ill ill 1"II;.o..tra\l-lled orbits of
COIIIIII"" law."
Though !lUllle ilia), lltill helieve there

-.

is a "great di~tance between seemingly
immovahle precedents and secmingly
irrt'~i~tihle ~tatutes", Ju s tice Traynor
says "the twain are always meP.ling in
the courl room", c!'peeially in Califor·
nia which "ahounds with judicial pre·
cl'dl'llts, snnwt imes as old as the gohl
frolll its hills but sometimes dated in
lhcir cxpcrience".
He puts thi~ case:
TI ... .!c'('f'a-('d i\Iary Ilncl (,)(('(,III('cl a
will le;l\"inl! her IInllle and Illllsi of ils
('nlll(,l1l ~ In Ih t' mill lin of IInl"'rl if ~he
wc're livilli! In n'cc' ivc Ihe h(''1I1C'~I; if
nnl, il w(lilid 1!<1 In Hnhert. Blllle'rl's
IIIIItlH'r pred.'C ('a-,' d Ihc~ h'-Ialrix, Sc'v.
('1',,1 year, afln i\lury c'xC'(,lItc,cllH'r will
~hc' llC'camc m!' nlally inc.'"IlI,,'IC'llt and
a hank w a~ "I'puintf'd ~lIl1rclian nf IlC'r
c'Iate, With COlirt IIppr<lvul. til!' !!lIl1rd·
ian ~ nld ]\lar),\ Ilfllllf! ftIT $2 1,000 1I11c1
kept Ihe proceed .. in II "'parat" IIC"
cnllnt. It ~I'c'nl IIf'ady ull til" Jll'lIcc'f'd~
10 ~lIppflrl Mary, wllet rc'lliaillf'cI ill('OIIl'
IlI'tenl In hn dyill/.: tlay, It Ic,ft inlllcl
nearly sewn Ihlln~and dC)llur~ in Ihe
1',,1 ale Ihal " 'ere nol [lUl't of Ihc~c [lro·
ceeds,
The qu c~tion was whether Hobert
could gel thal residlle in jlartial reslo·
ration of hi!' own nearly extin;':lIi!'llt'd
specific gifl. A "(]()c trine of aclc~ mp.
tion mollified with a smidgen of Lalin
was nol equal to a guardianship case.
Whatever its decejltively reasonahle

sOllnd, pro tanto ailr.Jllplion , like plain
adC'mpl ion was hOllnd to operatc errati·
cally a~ well a~ llarshl),," Of Ihe S21 ,000
the bank recei\'cd frolll tlte salc of noll·
crt's hou~e, bllt S!l.l!l,(j(, remained.
"Over twclve limr~ thllt SUIll rcmained
inlact to he clainwel n~ a rl'~idue, Pro
lanto was hardly pro I..-.no Rollerto."
Tholl;.:h ~ilcnt 011 III(' poinl hdore
Ihe court, Chief JlIstif'l~ Traynor in the
!Ieci!'ion of Ihi!' rasc f""nd California's
Prnhatc Coele of ~r(,111 valuc, lt~ rules
a~ to thc ahnlcnH'nl of tl'~lnlllcnlnry
;.:ifts mitigall! "I he nelveJ'l'c con~c·
CJIJCllcr!\ 10 a speci IiI: ,Ic'vi~cc or le;.:atee
whcn n ;.:i ft intellelrd f.. r him and nevrr
rt'\'okl'cl hy the (1011 or" i~ w'I'd "10 Illel'!
dlllrgc' ~ IIgaill~t Ihc~ t'·I"I,,", Wh)' 11111 u
t'''lIIl'arlll,J,~ rille ill 1I li"l~ !Oillintioll ex·

1"'1't Ihal

III 1I II Ilg«: IIIC'II I

rlltru~tt~tl to

"f till' t'~IIIII~ WII!!

a ~uIIT(lillll ratltl!r than 10

lin cXI'eulor? "Sweet LIre the uses of
advcr!'ity,
shared."

but

sweeter

IItill

when

The moral:
Wlwn II jllllicial rule i~ Ihlls mod·
eliI'd aftl~r II ~Ialulnry filII", the very
fact IOf cn"yin~ ~i/.:lciti('~ Ihlll it is not
In III' rfl,d"., 'd wilh intnprrllllinn Ihlll
clarifi('~ "" f)h~cllre ~I"llII(' or IImplifiC'!\
a "kdelul one. SlIrh u juclieiul rule

takes on a life of il~ own in Ihe com·
mon law. It can prove endlc ~ ~I)' u<dlll
wilhin ils own orbit alld may e"cn
serve as a modcl ilself /flr 5uccessh'e
judge·made rule~,
Even judges "who rcs i-I reaclin;; up
on any law out~ide that i,,~crihcd o n
thcir own caves", rnn~1I1t Ihe uniform
act!l of the National (onf"lrnre Corn·
mi!l~ioner!l on l ' niform ~Iate Laws.
When Ihe "formidahle" Ulliform Com·
meT(~ ial Code "begins It, rcvoh'e in
('ollllllon·law orhil!', it tlramalically
l' oml'd~ evrn tho~e who /IIay hitherto
h,l\'1! bec'lI IInhecding to ""Ie that in
tlll~ \':II'~lIard as well as ill the wake
of ~lIc h a sk),lllark Ihere a n ! many le~s
I'pectaeular planets". COUI ts have fo l·
lowed U.C.C. provisions even though
the code has not yet hcen enacted in
their jurisdictions. Like Ihe Restate·
ments, Ihe code has "the l'tamp of approval of a large body of American
IIchola rl'hil'''.
Thank!l to Henry Frirn,lIy's deci!'ion
in Vnitell Slalcl v. rr' egcIII,,'ic Corpo.
ration. ~~60 F. 2d 6U, (,7Ct (2<1 Cir.
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1966), "the Uniform Commercial Code
has become a major influence in the
development of common law in the fed·
eral courts to govern cases involving
go\'ernment contracts and othcr com·
mercial transactions". It has become
"a source of federal law", and Judge
Friendly has noted that it is "well on
its way to becoming a truly nalional
law of commerce".
Even the "diehard judge", resistant
to the use of statutes in the formulation of common law rules, can hardly
ignore the rich source of law in the
Uniform Commercial Code so that
by analogy in case after case in both
state and federal courts we have seen
the U.C.C. revolving in orbit to create
new law in areas where it has no direct
or official application.
Of course, it is "only when a case is
not governed by a statute" that a court
is "free to work out its own solution".
But once it formulates "a rule by anal·
ogy from a statutory rule, it creates a
precedent of the same force as any
other", which "may endure for generations or succumb to rapid obsolescence".
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As Roger Traynor says. "The real
proI.lem is not whether Judges should
.Hlke use of statutes, but how they can
make optimum use of them."
In answering thi!!, he calls attention
to the need for a national "Ministry of
Justice" that would collect and study
statutes and assist the Congress in national law reform. "Until 'there are
signs of a much closer watch on the
legislative process than we now have," !
Chief Justice Traynor asks, as do I, I
"What are we to think of the enigmatic '
aphorism that ours is a government of
laws and not of men?"
His answer is that,
H the lihrarians and re~earchers
will ~y~lemali7.e the ~tucfy of stalutes. if
the watchhirds will ~harpen their
watch on lel!i~latlircs in actiun, if commentators will ~et forlh ~alient !Jualifies or defccts of Icl!i~lulive products.
the juclj!es will ~lIrdy make better liFe
than they have of the statutes revolving
in common-law orhils, Then benefits
will flow in every .Iircction. pro bono
1111 {:o, pro bono Il "[lI'rlo, but above all
110 PUllC J.)llI1·~] pro lege et grege.

• Tll\I!\, I hope I have given you a
small sample oC Roger J. Traynor's
map:nificent pro!\e. It flows so beauli·
fully and with biblical quality.
Hoger Traynor. who once tau;:::ht
law. is still a scholar at heart. He has
put his learning to such good use that
today we must rate him a8 our master
legal phrase-maker, even 88 we did
Cardozo yesterday. What a beautiful
writer!
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